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Abstract 
 
This literature review highlights important factors that the theoretic research on corruption has 
found out, which should be helpful when creating an anti-corruption strategy. This is done by first 
acknowledging the principal-agent relationship that is between a corrupt official and its principal. 
While this has been the dominant way to consider corruption in a society, I will present through past 
research how the principal-agent model while offering important insights for fighting corruption, 
has also its flaws, which need to be addressed to understand corruption comprehensively. 
 
The factors important to anti-corruption are found by linking the past research with newer one 
through a central survey on corruption, which addresses possible ways to decrease corruption while 
also questioning the nature of corruption as simply a two-way relationship between a principal and 
agent. While this literature review does not offer a specific answer to corruption, it is clear from the 
review that corruption can not be considered a simple problem, and thus the creation of anti-
corruption strategies is not a simple matter that as of yet does not have a universal answer. 
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1. Introduction  
 
While corruption has recently gained more attention, it is by no means a new concept in our society 
and has existed long before economics or any other kind of social science researchers started including 
it in their research. Arthaśāstra, an ancient Indian treatise written between the 2nd century BCE and 3rd 
century CE, had an example of corruption occuring in the ancient Indian society. In the treatise there 
is a mention of public officials succumbing to greed, which lead to them to take a part of the income 
going to the king to themselves, which is a great example of a principal-agent problem from history 
(Kangle, 1972). As is evident from this, corruption has always had a negative connotation to it since it 
is affiliated with greed and selfishness. But while it was considered a hindrance in ancient times, 
corruption has become an even more noteworthy problem in the recent thirty years with multiple 
countries adopting anti-corruption policies to combat corruption, and international institutions and 
organizations like World Bank and UN recognizing corruption as a significant problem for the society 
(World Bank, 2020; UNODC, 2020). It is no surprise then that a lot of scholars across different fields 
have grown interested in understanding corruption and how to combat it. 
 
The push for a more corrupt-free world was partly due to the research on corruption showing the 
negative effects of corruption, especially the way it could potentially deteriorate the whole national 
economy of a country. With the increased data on corruption through for example corruption indices 
and questionnaires, economists have found alarming consequences of corruption. One of these is the 
relationship between the CPI, a corruption perception index by Transparency International, a non-
governmental organization from Germany that specializes in the research of corruption, and HDI, the 
Human Development index by UN, which considers the gross national income per capita, health and 
education. This correlation is backed by multiple studies (Johnston, 2005; Akçay, 2006; Reiter & 
Steensma, 2010; Askari, Rehman, & Arfaa, 2012), so it is no wonder that UN decided to pay more 
attention to corruption. On top of this there are multiple papers showing the negative effect corruption 
has on the national economy through reduced foreign direct investment (Wei, 2000; Habib & Zurawicki, 
2002; Egger & Winner, 2006), lower exports (Lee & Weng, 2013; Musila & Sigue, 2010) and diminished 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995; Aidt, 2009). The country leaders thus have a good reason to pursue 
the suppression of corruption to improve their countries’ economic situation. 
 
This line of thinking to this day though is not unanimous, and some authors have insisted on the positive 
effects corruption might have. This point of view on corruption can be traced back to 1964, when Leff 
argued that corruption could foster development in developing countries especially by getting rid of the 
harmful red tape entrepreneurs have to face when doing business with the public sector. This has later 




corruption might have in economic development. While it has not gained the acceptance of the majority, 
as none of the major international institutions have accepted it, there have been some amount of 
economic papers supporting grease the wheels theory, such as a theoretical approach by Lui (1985) to 
explain how bribes can make bureaucratic processes more efficient by reducing the amount of time 
spent in queues. Empirical papers have also found surprising results sometimes, and Egger & Winner 
before their 2006 paper found corruption to in fact increase FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005). Some 
researches have suggested that depending on the institutions of a country corruption might raise 
efficiency and thus result in economic growth (Mironov, 2005; Méon & Weill, 2010). For example, In 
the paper by Méon & Weill, when the institutional quality of a country is poor, corruption can have 
either no significant relation or a positive relation with economic growth. Despite these the amount of 
empirical research showing corruption to be detrimental is overwhelming compared to the research 
supporting the grease the wheels view, which explains its unpopularity. Corruption has been described 
also as “never more than a second-best solution”, since by it being illegal, there will be some transaction 
costs to evade getting caught (Rose-Ackerman, 1978; Shleifer, 1993; Aidt, 2003). 
 
To combat corruption, one first must understand why corruption exists and what the underlying 
conditions for corrupt behavior are. While it could be possible that as stated in the ancient treatise 
Arthaśāstra corruption stems from greed ultimately, the problem itself seems to be much more complex. 
In certain countries corruption might be a necessity to a business and getting a license might not even 
be possible if bribes are not used (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993]. Corruption thus can become a way to 
provide solutions in a defective society (Marquette & Peiffer, 2017), so blaming corruption on the greed 
of the briber is a crude way to perceive corruption.  
 
Fixing such defective society will bring about costs. Thus, the people making anti-corruption strategies 
must to some extent know whether the benefits are higher than the costs. While I will not delve deeper 
into the negative economic consequences of corruption, as they are not the focus of this literature 
review, this might explain to some extent why corruption is perceived even in some of the least corrupt 
countries like the Nordic countries, at least according to the Transparency International’s CPI. Later in 
this thesis, I will also introduce by an illustration, which will highlight why some level of corruption is 
acceptable. 
 
There have been different ways researches have tried to model corruption to better understand ways 
to prevent it, and since this problem isn’t limited to only a single academic field, contributions have 
been made by different branches of social science, but most notably for this paper by Economics, 
Political science, Management, Law, and Sociology. What all these academic fields share in common in 




them. This theory is known as agency theory and especially in the research of corruption it can be used 
to model the situation, where someone acts for, or in the place of another, given he has been given 
authority to do so. This sounds awfully familiar to a corruption situation, which is why it was one of the 
first ways to try to understand corruption. While the agency theory does seem like an adequate 
framework to try to solve the problem of corruption, it might not offer the answer for an optimal solution 
despite the amount of research that has honed it to its current state. It is important to understand the 
implications it has though, which is why this paper will use it as a base to model the ways to prevent 
corruption. But I will also illustrate the problems the theory has and how by understanding the problems, 
anti-corruption literature can benefit from the studies even if they do not represent the situations 
realistically. 
 
This thesis will through a literature review raise important factors that should be considered in the 
implementation of anti-corruption strategies. The basis of the analyzation is Aidt’s paper, which surveys 
the economics of corruption, and offers insights on the nature of corruption. Before this, agency theory, 
or more specifically the principal-agent relationship, will be introduced. After presenting Aidt’s findings, 
a new view on corruption will be introduced, which can be seen to be linked with his paper.  
 
1.1 Defining corruption and the different groups in the principal-agency 
problem 
 
The definition of corruption has not always been the same across different research papers, and while 
it was more precise before, corruption’s definition now has become broader to fit the different situations 
better. Transparency International updates a corruption ranking used in many of the modern corruption 
researches, and thus their broad definition of corruption seems to be the most accepted version at this 
time. “The abuse of entrusted power for private gain” summarizes well the nature of corruption, since 
even though corruption might get associated only with public officials and leaders abusing their power, 
it is not unprecedented to find corruption in the private sector, for example inside a big corporation 
there might be high ranking executives favoring their relatives in recruitment. In theoretic research the 
definition might be a little more specific, and especially in the examples and models in this paper, the 
private sector will be left uncovered, so corruption will mostly be a public sector problem to simplify 





Figure 1: Relations between the citizens and decision-makers (Jain 2001) 
 
The image above illustrates the possible relations the citizens, public officials, leaders, and lawmakers 
might have, and it shows the places where corruption can be found. This image should be kept in mind 
in the future chapters related more closely to the principal-agent problem, since this also shows the 
possible locations where agency theory is relevant. While it does not really fit the research covered in 
this paper, a viable addition to this image could be the relations inside a corporation, where for example 
the relations of stock holders, board of directors, and the CEO can suffer from principal-agency 
problems. In the next chapter I will discuss more about these relations to give better understanding 
who are usually the principals and who the agents. 
 
The numbers in the image are related to the different types of corruption according to Jain. The relation 
numbered by one demonstrates the so called “Grand corruption” in the corruption literature and as the 
name implies, it is the corruption happening on larger scale. In other words, in this type of corruption 
the decision-makers on the top of the government hierarchy, the agents, are exploiting the citizens, 
the principal, for their own good. This type of corruption is for example what has happened recently in 
Latin America with the Odebrecht-case (Gallas, 2019), where multiple Latin American political leaders 
including presidents were convicted of bribery. These types of bribes can possibly affect whole countries, 
since the corrupt leaders might choose a policy benefiting the briber because of the bribe. In Brazil, 
the construction projects for the football stadiums for the 2014 FIFA World Cup were affected by 




This corruption type thus can have a big effect on the national economy, since large sums of money 
are in question. 
 
The relation corresponding to number two in the picture is a smaller scale corruption called 
“bureaucratic corruption” by Jain. In this type of corruption the lower ranking public officials are always 
a participant, but unlike in grand corruption, this type of corruption can be between public officials and 
the political leaders acting as their superiors, as well as between public officials and the citizens. 
Bureaucratic corruption is more visible in everyday life especially in corruption-ridden countries, where 
citizens might bribe a police officer to evade a fine or bribe a public official to speed up the process of 
getting a passport. This type of small-scale corruption has been called in the corruption literature “petty 
corruption” in contrast to grand corruption. Even though a single incident with this type of corruption 
might not have as big of an impact as grand corruption, it can still have an impact on the national 
economy since it is more common, and especially since every instance changes the perception the 
citizens have on corruption (Persson et al., 2013). 
 
The last type in the image indicated by number three called “legislative corruption”, is the type of 
corruption that has not been that relevant to the economists researching corruption, possibly because 
it is not as easy model as the other two shown in the image. It is nevertheless very relevant to the 
anti-corruption strategies, which I will discuss later, since the legislators can have a big impact on the 
corruption climate in a country. If the legislature is corrupt in a country, getting rid of corruption will 

















2. The agency problem of corruption 
 
The agency theory’s roots can be traced hundreds of years back to the book that is considered to have 
started classical economics, The Wealth of Nations, the magnus opus of Adam Smith (1776). In his 
book he acknowledges the problem organizations face, when a manager(agent) is handed control over 
an owner’s(principal) property. He points out that the managers cannot be expected to take care of 
said property “with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery 
frequently watch over their own” and thus the managers can act in a way the owners would consider 
negligent or profuse. Even though the problem was acknowledged so early, it took until the 1970s for 
economists to refind this problem and start to create models to understand the consequences these 
problems related to the agent might have (Kiser, 1999]. Next, I will explain the agency problem, also 
known as principal-agent problem, which is the core of agency theory and the framework many 
researchers used to examine corruption. 
 
Ross (1973) in his research was first to make an economic model of the agency problem, which he 
called “The Principal’s problem”. This problem arose when the principal and agent both strived to 
maximize their utility function while asymmetric information was present. In this situation the agent 
has more information and thus the principal must give incentives to him to maximize his own utility. 
He showed this through a mathematical model, thanks to which the economic foundation for agency 
theory has a comprehensive mathematical basis, as multiple other economists created mathematical 
models to contribute to this theory. While he argues that the examples of agency are universal, and 
thus could be applied to the research of organizations other than firms, the problem was used in 
economics as a framework to study firms at the beginning, probably somewhat due to another 
important paper succeeding it. 
 
Ross’s paper inspired two economists to research the agency problem further, and thus probably the 
most influential agency theory related paper (over 90000 citations at the time of writing) was published 
by M.C Jensen and W.H Meckling in 1976. This paper introduced a solution to the problem presented 
by the agency theory, a problem Jensen and Meckling described as a problem of ownership, which lead 
to logical conclusion to tackle this problem. They used a firm as the organization to show this problem, 
similar to how Smith also chose a firm to best show the problem. Since the managers (agents) did not 
have any ownership over the firm, their solution to the problem was to give some of this ownership to 
the managers, which works both as an incentive and a deterrent, since now the manager had to share 





This solution of ownership sharing, which could also be understood as a form of outcome-based 
incentive, is easy to replicate into joint-stock companies, where the CEO could for example have a part 
of his salary come as shares of the company (Jensen & Meckling 1976). Sadly, this solution is not as 
easy to replicate into government bureaucracies, where it is hard to give a public official a “share of 
the government (or the country perhaps)”, since while one could consider the government to be an 
organization like a company, the “owners” are in a way supposed to be the citizens. So, having the 
public officials gain more government owned property for example would not probably work. Although 
it can be argued that every public officials’ job has already part of their utility function shared with the 
country’s, since they are a part of the country’s “owners”. They should then always have some incentive 
to do their job as well as possible, since doing their job badly would hurt the country, and thus their 
welfare too. Obviously, the situation is not this easy, and the gained utility from corruption, in short-
term especially, for example would feel bigger to them than the lost utility of the “country doing worse”, 
which for them would also be hard to perceive compared to a payment they can instantly perceive on 
their bank account. 
  
Researches have brought up other solution methods for the principal-agent problem, albeit sadly these 
solutions are mostly meant to be applicable to firms. Panda and Leepsa (2013) in their literature review 
of the agency theory list these remedies, and besides the managerial ownership discussed before, other 
ways to reduce the problem in a firm are increased debt level, blockholders (basically a more 
concentrated ownership in a firm), dividends, board of directors (including more outside and 
independent directors) and “market for corporate control” (efficient firm acquiring a poor performing 
firm). Two of the remedies listed by Panda and Leepsa could be applied to anti-corruption though, first 
of them being executive compensation. While this is a vague solution, it is still one that could easily be 
used to deter corruption. Core, Holthause, & Larcker (1999) theorize that by constantly revising the 
agents compensation and by creating an adequate incentive package, the agent would work harder for 
the firm (or in our case, a governmental organization), which would also increase the wealth the 
principals would gain. Perhaps because it is the vaguest, it is the most applicable. Another interesting 
solution method that sadly does not get discussed in the anti-corruption literature, is “the labor market” 
remedy, which expects the agents to pursue better opportunities from the labor market. According to 
this remedy, the agent needs to prove themselves with every job, since their value in the labor market 
is based on his previous jobs. By creating more opportunities in the labor market of a public bureaucracy, 
more competition could be created, which would lead to the agents to strive for better performance 
and possibly lower corruption, if succeeding in the labor market would require the agent to be non-
corrupted. Thus, an already corrupted labor market would completely repeal any positive effects a 





While the two influential economic papers might not offer the solution to the agency problem happening 
with corruption, and the applications of firm focused agency theory might not work so well inside a 
public bureaucracy, the principles do introduce an interesting way to analyze the problem and a way 
to conceptualize corruption to be a problem of incentives, deterrents and monitoring, where an agent 
decides based on these whether to participate or not in corrupt acts. To apply the principles to the 
research of corruption, the models created for corruption illustration have used more the basic models 
made by other famous economists. These models are as old as the classical principal-agent models, 
and while they are not specifically labeled to be a part of the agency theory literature but rather crime 
literature, they do have similarities and complement each other especially in situations with corruption 
being the main focus. 
 
A principal-agent problem in a firm is not necessarily illegal, since while the CEO’s and other managers 
job is to maximize the utility of the stockholders, doing a “bad job” might just result from them being 
incompetent managers. But since corruption is illegal, crime literature can be used more effectively to 
design incentive programs to the corrupt agents. Classic papers by Becker (1968) and Becker & Stigler 
(1974) offered a starting point to the research of corruption from the perspective of a principal-agent 
relationship, where the agent was the one giving into corruption and thus committing crime. While I 
will not elaborate on their models, since the example in the next chapter has a simpler method to 
illustrate their findings, these papers serve as the foundation to deterring crime by: modeling wage 
incentives in the form of a efficiency wage to raise the opportunity cost of corruption, increasing 
punishments to raise the costs of committing corruption, and to raise the probability of getting caught 
to raise the proportion of the costs of corruption (punishments and loss of job) compared to the benefits 
in a decision-making situation involving corruption. 
 
The books by Rose-Ackerman (1978) and Klitgaard (1988) have extensively used the principal-agent 
model to analyze corruption and have worked to popularize this point of view in the research of 
corruption. Both books also offer insights that can be used in anti-corruption strategies, Rose-Ackerman 
especially defining areas where anti-corruption can be the most beneficial, and Klitgaard offering 
multiple means to combat corruption (Groenendijk, 1997). While these have been important works to 
the topic, I chose a survey on corruption made by Aidt (2003) as an exemplary paper to highlight the 
important factors that should be considered when creating an anti-corruption strategy. This paper not 
only is relatively easy to understand, will also nicely link the past theory with principal-agent relationship 
being given to a newer theory that has gained recent popularity. The next two chapters will present 






3. Example of an agency relationship with corruption by Aidt 
and possible corruption controls 
 
In this chapter I will present the model for corruption by Aidt (2003) to show a possible way to take 
the principles of agency theory and Becker’s & Stigler’s papers into the research of corruption. This 
model is supposed to be specific, which is why the example is about corruption happening in tax 
collection. While the example is a specific case, it is a good way to introduce the problems that arise 
with corruption control, and more importantly, to show how the agency theory can be flawed in practice, 
at least when the research is about corruption. The example does introduce a few factors 
decisionmakers should consider when constructing an anti-corruption strategy. 
 
3.1 Tax collection example by Aidt (2003) 
 
This relatively simple example models the agency relationship between a tax collector and government, 
where the tax collector is the agent and the government are the principal. This is a perfect example of 
bureaucratic corruption, which could also be petty corruption, if the scale was smaller, for example if 
the tax is collected from an individual for a small transaction he did like selling stocks for profit. An 
important addition to the corruption situations in this case though is the firms, which while are not 
explicitly stated to be part of the problem, still affect the problem. The firm being the briber thus has 
decision power on the bribe amount, and Aidt first defines how much this bribe is. The function for the 
bribe in his model is 
𝑏 = max[𝑘(𝜋 − 𝑝𝑔), 0] (1) 
where 𝑘 is the amount of the bribe recovered by the tax collector, 𝜋 is the amount of profit the firm 
makes, 𝑝 is the probability of the government finding out corruption (in this case the bribe), and 𝑔 is 
the penalty paid by the firm if it is caught bribing. 
 
The variable 𝑘 is introduced as a transaction cost, since bribing requires secrecy, which will result in 
additional costs, for example hiding the evidence of bribing or even bribing other people with the 
knowledge of the original bribing. All of this will make the final amount of the bribe to be less than it 
might be perceived. As it is possible to see from the function, a negative profit or a zero profit will result 
in a no-bribe situation, since in this problem of tax collection, the firm only needs to pay taxes (and 
then bribes), if they make profit. In this example the tax rate is assumed to be 100%, which is why the 




tax collector decides to take a bribe. The function for this is (1 − 𝑝) ∗ (𝑤 + 𝑏) + 𝑝(𝑤0 − 𝑓) > 𝑤, where 
𝑤  is the tax collector’s wage in the public sector, 𝑤0 is the tax collector’s wage he could get in the 
private sector, and 𝑓 is the fine paid by the tax collector if he is caught. According to this function, not 
getting caught will mean the tax collector gains both the public sector’s wage and the bribe amount, 
and if he is caught, he will still be able to work in the private sector, but will also have to pay the fine. 
This function can be simplified into 
(1 − 𝑝) ∗ 𝑏 + 𝑝(𝑤0 − 𝑤 − 𝑓) > 0 (2) 
which shows the important factors that affect the tax collector’s decision making. Aidt lists these 
controlling elements into three groups: “the wage rate (𝑤), the monitoring system (𝑝), and the legal 
remedies (𝑔, 𝑓)”. It is easy to see how these three elements are connected to the agency theory, where 
the wage rate corresponds to the incentive, the monitoring system to the monitoring, and the legal 
remedies to the deterrents. Thus, it can be argued that corruption can be reduced by changing the 
wage rate, developing the monitoring system, or increasing the punishments. This model has similarities 
to the Becker & Stigler (1974) and Becker (1968) models, which also conclude that wages, monitoring, 
and fines are an important factor when controlling crime, which could be for example be bribery. Next, 
I will take a deeper look into these three categories of corruption control. 
 
3.2 Wage rate and the pay incentives to public officials 
 
Aidt (2003) introduces the concept of efficiency wages, to serve as a way to decide a proper wage rate. 
This type of efficiency wage was proposed by Becker and Stigler (1974) in the aforementioned paper, 
which was about law enforcement and more relevantly to this section, about the ways the “enforcers” 
(agents) could be incentivized to not engage in malfeasance, which in his example could have been for 
example bribery. In his paper he states that “the fundamental answer is to raise the salaries of enforcers 
above what they could get elsewhere”, in Aidt’s tax collector case it would simply be raising 𝑤 to be 
higher than 𝑤0 by some amount. This in essence is an efficiency wage, and it is simple to formulate it 
from the simplified function in the last chapter. The efficiency wage in Aidt’s example is  




Now it is possible to see the mark up needed for the private sector’s wage if the government would 
like to model a more efficient wage rate. With a more efficient monitoring system, this mark-up would 
be small, as it can be seen from the function that big 𝑝 value would imply a lower ratio the bribe is 
multiplied by. While in this example this would be the optimal wage rate, raising wage rates might not 





Both Hong Kong’s and Singapore’s anti-corruption reforms used efficiency wages as a corruption control 
successfully, where public salaries where raised higher than the private sector salaries (Bardhan, 1997). 
Cross-national regression analysis has been made to test the possible relation between higher salaries 
and lower corruption and the results seem to indicate towards statistically significant relationship 
(Panizza et al., 2001; Van Rijckeghem & Weder, 2001). This relationship was questioned by Treisman 
(2007), as he argued about the robustness of the results. Treisman found no statistically significant 
relationship between public official’s wages and corruption, so it can be argued that there is no sufficient 
evidence on the incentive wages at least from a cross-national perspective (Gans-Morse et al., 2018).  
 
A study by Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2015) examined the impact of wage reforms on Ghanaian 
police officers when compared to the police officers in Burkina Faso, where wages stayed low. This is 
an example of petty corruption where the Ghanaian and Burkinabe police officers could be bribed at 
checkpoints. The Ghana Government doubled the police officer’s wage in an attempt to reduce 
corruption, but unfortunately while the number of bribes decreased due to the wage reform, the 
average size of the bribe increased, and because of this the total amount of bribe increased. Raising 
wages can thus have some other consequences even though it might lower the amount bribery acts. 
In petty corruption situations the effects might differ from grand corruption examples significantly, 
although unfortunately there does not seem to be any research done on the wage reforms targeted 
towards high level bureaucrats or political leaders. Gans-Morse et al. (2018) summarize in their review 
on anti-corruption methods, that while the wages contribute to the reduction of corruption, they are 
usually insufficient on their own, but since results from different study methods (quantitative study on 
macro and micro level as well as qualitative study) are differing, no conclusive answer can be given. 
 
3.3 Monitoring and the probability of getting caught 
 
It is easy to see from simplified function, how by raising the probability of getting caught (𝑝) the tax 
collector has a stronger incentive to not engage in corruption, since a high value of 𝑝 will result in a 
smaller effect on the bribe and larger effect on the possibly negative part of the function (𝑤0 − 𝑤 − 𝑓). 
The probability of getting caught can be increased by creating a more developed monitoring system, 
which can prove to be costly. Laffont and Guessan (1999) point out that if the people in charge of 
monitoring the system are corrupted, an increase in monitoring (a larger budget for monitoring for 
example) might increase corruption. The monitoring system is also significantly more complex system 
than for example raising public wages, and thus just pumping money into monitoring might not simply 





There have been many ways corruption researchers have approached this control type, but one of the 
simplest ways of increasing monitoring would be top-down monitoring or an extreme case of this, a 
crackdown against corruption. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2003) were able to take advantage of a 
unique event that happened in the capital of Argentina, Buenos Aires, in their study. In 1996 a new 
government with a goal to reduce corruption was elected for Argentina, which resulted in closer 
monitoring, in this case especially on input prices public hospitals had to pay to get needed supplies, 
which offered a new way analyze the effects of a crackdown and public officials’ wages on the input 
prices. These procurement prices served to measure corruption, as Di Tella and Schargrodsky attributed 
the price variation to the corruption-related expenses, where lower prices meant some of those 
expenses had to have been eliminated. For the first nine months after the new government they found 
a 15 percent decrease on the prices the medical supplies, after which reduced to 10 percent decrease. 
If the indirect effect on corruption can be trusted then, it can be argued that monitoring can decrease 
corruption.  
 
Another way to increase the probability of getting caught would be transparency, which in this case 
can be defined as the easiness to gain information about corrupt cases. One of the most researched 
factors supposed to influence corruption related to transparency are the studies made on the 
relationship between freedom of press and corruption. On a macro level, Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 
(2015), Brunetti & Weder (2003), Camaj (2012) as well as Treisman (2007) have done cross-national 
regression studies on this relationship and found high freedom of press reducing corruption levels, at 
least the perceived levels. The studies related to freedom of press seem to have rather unanimous 
results on the relationship, so there is no reason to exclude freedom of press when creating an anti-
corruption strategy. There are also specific studies about the effect of certain transparency laws such 
as financial disclosure laws and freedom of information laws. For example, Vargas and Schlutz (2016) 
found the implementation of financial disclosure laws to reduce corruption, though only “perceived” 
corruption. On the other hand, implementation of freedom of information laws had an opposite effect 
on the perceived corruption (Costa, 2013). Gans-Morse et al. (2018) argue this to be the case, because 
freedom of information laws expose more corruption to the people that answer the questionnaires that 
make up the corruption perception indexes, and thus raise the levels of perceived corruption.  
 
A modern view to transparency and monitoring is the usage of internet and e-governments. If corrupt 
transactions can only be done online, it should be easier to notice corrupt behavior as data of the 
transactions can be used to keep a track of corrupt practices in the system. Thus, it serves as an 
efficient method to monitor agents. These claims have been backed up by empirical research, and for 
example Andersen (2009) and Elbahnasawy (2014) find evidence from international data, that the 







The effect of increasing the punishments (𝑔, 𝑓) in Aidt’s example is also relatively simple to see, as a 
larger fine for the tax collector (𝑓) will increase the deducting portion of the function, the same one 
that is affected by 𝑝. Increasing 𝑔 will lower the bribe amount as the firm is less encouraged to bribe. 
Increasing punishments as a way to reduce illicit behavior can also be seen in paper by Becker (1968) 
and Becker and Stigler (1974). In terms of costs, raising punishments seems like a great way to 
decrease corruption, since the government will not need to pay higher wages or higher monitoring 
costs. This could be the reason why some countries, such as China, have adopted radical anti-corruption 
methods by increasing this punishment by imposing death penalties to public officials (especially high-
ranking ones) (Lu & Zhang, 2005). 
 
Even if the effect of punishments as cost inducing factor in an individual’s decision-making has been 
known for a long time, there does not seems to be sufficient empirical research on the subject (Gan-
Morse, 2018). Some experimental research seems to indicate towards a lower bribing incentive when 
punishments are high (Abbink et al., 2002). Hasty (2005) also in her paper notices that in Ghana, higher 
punishments were less effective than alternative methods, when official was caught for corruption. Also, 
without sufficient monitoring high sanctions will be useless, as the punishment relies on the corrupt 














4. Other notable findings on corruption’s nature  
 
In this chapter I will present the other findings Aidt made in his corruption review that are not 
specifically corruption control methods. They are still important factors to consider when creating an 
anti-corruption strategy, as they illustrate the different features corruption has, and how an incentive-
based method might not be optimal solution. This chapter will address how it might not be optimal to 
expunge corruption in some cases, as it is costly to do so. Aidt’s paper has also a simple model about 
the self-reinforcing nature of corruption, which I will go over. Lastly, his paper’s main argument will be 
introduced, which will lead this literature review to the newest addition of anti-corruption literature in 
the next chapter. 
 
4.1 Social welfare with and without corruption 
 
To prevent corruption there must be some costs, since changing the controls is not free. To better 
illustrate this Aidt creates a utilitarian approach to model social welfare. Since the principal is assumed 
to be benevolent in the tax collection example, he assumes that the exogenous factors (𝑤, 𝑝, 𝑓 and 𝑔) 
are designed optimally. The model will use explicit incentives, and to highlight its welfare effects, certain 
assumptions will be made (𝑝 = 𝑓 = 𝑔 = 0 and reservation wage [𝑤0 = 0]). The social welfare can be 
formulated as: 
𝑢𝑝 = 𝑡(∙) − 𝑤(∙) + 𝛼(𝑢𝑓 + 𝑢𝑡) (4) 
where 𝑡(∙) − 𝑤(∙)  indicate the tax revenues consisting of tax policy subtracted by the incentive wage, 
𝑢𝑡 is the tax collector’s welfare consisting of the incentive wage 𝑤(∙) and bribe 𝑏,  𝑢𝑓 is the welfare of 
the firm that can either be 𝜋 − 𝑡 if profits are made or −𝑎𝑡 if there are no profits, and 𝛼 ∈ (0,1) which 
shows the weight assigned to the welfares of the firm and the tax collector. Aidt explains the reason 
for the parameter 𝑎 is to show taxes are more costly, when there are no profits, and thus discourages 
the government to tax in such situation, and if the parameter’s value is big enough, tax collector’s 
information about the profits is needed.  
 
The tax collector has probability 𝜀 to notice a firm earning profits, the firm has probability ℎ to gain 
profits, and the probability of the tax collector being corrupt is 1 − 𝛾. Obviously, when a firm makes no 
profits the tax collector will tell so to the principal (government). But in the other case tax collector can 
either report a firm earning profits or not, in which case tax collector could be lying to gain a bribe 
according to function (1) (with the assumptions taken into account, 𝑏 = 𝑘𝜋). To show some amount of 




(1 − 𝛼)𝜀𝜋, in which case the government itself can notice with probability 𝜀, if there are profits, and 
can choose to not tax, if there are no profits. Since there is a principal-agent relationship between the 
government and the tax collector, a probability of corruption 1 − 𝛾 will need to be addressed and an 
incentive is made.  
 
Aidt introduces two situations, one where there is no corruption and one where there is corruption. In 
the situation with no corruption, corruption is solved by giving an incentive wage the size of the bribe 
whenever high profits is reported. This leads to an expected social welfare of  
𝑢𝑝
𝑁𝐶 = ?̅?𝑝 − 𝜀ℎ(1 − 𝛼)𝑘𝜋 (5) 
which is less than the benchmark amount, since the incentive wage while eliminating corruption, raises 
the costs government must pay (𝑘𝜋) with a probability of 𝜀ℎ. Instead, in a situation with corruption no 
incentive wage is paid, and the expected social welfare is 
𝑢𝑝
𝐶 = ?̅?𝑝 − (1 − 𝛾)𝜀ℎ(1 − 𝛼𝑘)𝜋 (6) 
and it is also less than the benchmark value since the acceptance of bribes lowers social welfare by 
(1 − 𝛼𝑘)𝜋 as some taxes are not collected. Only the corrupt tax collectors are considered in the 
probability in this situation. 
 
From figure 2 it is possible to see how expected social welfare changes in relation to the transaction 
costs, where low transaction costs (𝑘 >
(1−𝛾)
1−𝛼𝛾
) imply that allowing corruption more preferable than 
offering high incentive wages. It is simple to understand the reasoning behind this, as high transaction 
costs lower received bribe amount, and thus the tax collector has less of an incentive to accept them. 
This example shows how some amount of corruption might be acceptable if a country wants to 
maximize its welfare, and thus the optimal anti-corruption strategy might need to allow corruption to 






Figure 2: Expected social welfare in relation to Transaction Cost (Aidt 2003) 
 
4.2 The effect of history in corruption 
 
The last model I will introduce from Aidt’s paper is his “self-reinforcing corruption” model, which takes 
a different approach to the tax collector example that was used in the other models as well. This model 
introduces the idea of history into tax collection and is not thus as individualistic as the typical principal-
agent relationship. He lists three reasons why the state of the organization or society can affect an 
individual’s decision-making based on past papers:  
(1) “It is harder to audit corrupt officials in societies where corruption is more prevalent.”  
(2) “Corrupt individuals want to interact with other corrupt individuals and continue to be corrupt if 
they have interacted with a sufficient number of corrupt individuals in the past.” 
(3) “The reward to rent-seeking relative to entrepreneurship is high in societies where most 
individuals seek rents and accept bribes.” 
 
The model used to link past corruption to the present and future corruption is fairly simple, and the 
only new component to the tax collector example is a cumulative density function (𝐹[∙]) of corrupt 
officials’ cost of not reporting the honestly, or as Aidt calls them “the internalized moral costs”  (𝑐). 
These corrupt officials are in this example both the tax collectors and auditors, since a tax collector 




by comparing the expected gain of bribe-taking and not taking a bribe, the proportion of corrupt 
individuals is 
1 − 𝛾 = 𝐹[(1 − 𝑝)𝑏 − 𝑝𝛾𝑤] (7) 
with the assumption that 𝑓, 𝑔, and 𝑤0 are zero. The function shows how when the probability of getting 
caught (𝑝) is small, the number of corrupt officials will be high (1 − 𝛾). Aidt argues that this can create 
multiple equilibria, where the past number of corrupt officials will determine to which equilibria the 
society will shift to. This function can be plotted into a two-dimensional coordinate plane (Figure 3), 
where axes represent the proportion of corrupt officials (1 − 𝛾) and show the equilibrium points with 
different levels of corruption.  
 
The point L corresponds to “stable low-corruption equilibrium”, which is achieved when the number of 
corrupt officials was low (less than 1 − 𝛾𝑀) in the past. If the number of corrupt officials was high 
(more than  1 − 𝛾𝑀), then the society will shift to the point H, “a stable high-corruption equilibrium”. 
The final point in the figure (M), is an unstable equilibrium that is somewhere between the first two 
points and serves more as a reference point to determine whether a high or low corruption equilibrium 
will happen. The dotted line shows an alternative function, which has had an anti-corruption strategy 
implemented (in this case a significant wage incentive) and thus the curve has shifted enough 
downwards to eliminate the high-corruption equilibrium. In this situation corruption “is solved” and the 
low-corruption equilibrium achieved, but since change itself must be notable enough for this to happen, 
small changes are useless and even detrimental since social welfare might be lost. I will introduce this 
concept called by Aidt as “a big push” again in the later chapters.  
 





4.3 The significance of benevolence in corruption 
 
The final element from Aidt’s paper from 2003 that is important to understand corruption better is the 
distinction between theories assuming a benevolent principal and a non-benevolent principal. Under 
the assumption of a benevolent principal, corruption controls from chapter 3 can be useful by creating 
optimal institutions that incentivize, punish, and monitor to minimize corruption in societies, although 
as can be learned from the example in chapter 4.1, fully minimizing corruption might not be preferable 
for a society which maximizes its social welfare. To design better institutions, he argues the assumption 
of a benevolent principal must be discarded, since the nature of the institutions cannot be left out of 
the equation, when changing them fundamentally.  
 
Aidt links this assumption of a non-benevolent principal to the “grabbing hand” model, a way to view 
the government’s interaction with markets. This term was invented by Shleifer and Vishny to give an 
alternative view to the ideas of the “invisible hand”, where the government should not intervene with 
the markets, since they would work well as individual businesses were guided by their self-interest, and 
the “helping hand”, where the government can join the market to help development (Shleifer & Vishny, 
2002). The helping hand thus from a principal-agent perspective assumes a benevolent principal, the 
government. Grabbing hand on the other hand expects the government officials to go after rents in the 
markets, which results in inefficiencies since they can for example to extract bribes create entry 
restrictions (Aidt, 2016).  
 
The point made in Aidt’s paper is that both views, the helping hand(a benevolent principal) or the 
grabbing hand (a non-benevolent principal), offer valuable contributions to the study of corruption, and 
in this paper’s case, the study of anti-corruption. While it might be naïve to consider every country to 
have a benevolent government, understanding the ways to optimize institutions can be helpful to 
combat corruption. And in Nordic countries for example it is not far-fetched to consider the governments 
to be almost fully benevolent, at least when it comes to corruption. But since most countries where 
corruption is a big problem, the country is already riddled with it, anti-corruption strategies should aim 
to consider every part of the society to possibly be corrupt. In the next chapter an alternative way to 
model corruption is introduced, which is heavily linked to the findings of the study by Aidt I’ve 





5. Criticism against the principal-agent problem and 
introduction of collective action theory 
 
The agency theory approach to the study of corruption has clearly been the dominant one, as Ugur 
and Dasgupta (2011) demonstrate in their meta-analysis of corruption’s impact on economic growth, 
where the dominant way to construct the models was through a principal-agent model’s principles in 
115 reviewed studies. In the recent years a new wave of anti-corruption research has grown popularity 
(Mungiu-Pippidi, 2011; Persson et al., 2013; Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein & Varriach, 2017), with their 
uniting view being the opposition towards agency theory, and replacing it with a new more applicable 
theory. According to these papers, corruption as a principal-agent problem is an outdated view, and a 
big reason, why anti-corruption reforms have not worked as well as expected. These authors have 
suggested an alternative approach to corruption, instead of treating it as a principal-agent problem, 
corruption should really be a problem of collective action. Next, I will explain the reasoning behind the 
reduced attention towards agency theory in anti-corruption literature and the so called “new approach” 
using collective action theory. 
 
5.1 Limitations of principal-agent model 
 
While the opposition towards the implementation of agency theory on anti-corruption strategies began 
mostly only about ten years ago, agency theory itself has always had some opposition, especially the 
economics view of agency theory. Some scholars have for example criticized the typical economics 
assumption of a self-interested utility maximizer in the classical agency theory and Perrow (1986) 
argues parties can be other-regarding and altruistic depending on the setting or organizational structure. 
This line of thinking was adapted in management literature as stewardship theory, which emphasizes 
the agents’ tendency to in fact be cooperative and coordination seeking. Other social sciences have 
also criticized the classical agency theory for its simplicity and how in real life problems are not just 
two-sided, instead there are usually more participants, who can also possibly be both principals and 
agents. 
 
These critiques are somewhat outdated now though, since a lot of agency models allow for more 
complex organizations with multiple principals and agents (e.g. Bac, 1996). In fact, the principal-agent 




2018), since while it has the bureaucratic corruption’s principal-agent relationship between a higher 
ranked politician (principal) and a lower ranked public official (agent), it also has another principal-
agent relationship between citizens (principal) and all the public officials (agent). Thus, a public official 
can be both a principal and an agent at the same time, which leads to the perhaps biggest flaw in the 
principal-agency model applied to corruption. 
 
As can be seen from some of the previous examples, the agency theory favors the principal mostly, 
and the problems are usually assigned to the agent. Especially in agency theories applied to the theory 
of firm, the stockholders’ utilities maximizations are the focus of the theory, and in those models the 
principals are assumed to be benevolent while the agents are possibly malevolent. This assumption of 
an always benevolent principal is the reason why especially in the study of corruption, agency theory 
can become a problematic framework according to the opposers of agency theory, since the bureaucrat 
that is supposed to be the benevolent party in one relationship, can also be malevolent in another 
relationship. In such a situation, while the agent is supposed to be a rational and self-interested 
maximizer of utility, the principal supposedly tries to maximize the social welfare of its principal, the 
citizens (Persson et al., 2013). And if the system is corrupted from the top high-ranking bureaucrats to 
the bottom low-ranking bureaucrats, would these high-ranking bureaucrats hold their agent part 
accountable for corruption, since they could demand a proportion of the corrupt act (bribe for example) 
to himself in exchange for not reporting the incident. Collective action theory works especially in these 
types of situations, where everyone is already supposed to be a part of a corrupt system. 
 
5.2 Collective action theory 
 
While the application of collective action theory is relatively new to the literature of corruption, the 
foundation of collective action theory was made by Olson in 1965. His argument was that even though 
the past economics study had assumed a group of rational and self-interested individuals to try to 
achieve a common objective, if everyone would be better off when this objective was reached, the 
“rational, self-interested individuals will not act to achieve their common or group interests” (Olson, 
1965). This leads to classic collective action problem, where the common objective is not achieved 
because there is a possibility to “free-ride” if the benefit from that common objective cannot be 
excluded from the non-participants. This leads to situation where common objective will not be achieved 





After the Olson’s paper multiple authors have studied the factors that affect individual’s reluctance to 
participate in the reach of the common objective. An important reason seems to be how the participants 
perceive the others to act, and thus they make decisions how they should act based on these 
assumptions (Ostrom, 1990; Persson et al., 2013). This is mostly why collective action theory is argued 
to be applicable to the study of corruption, as even an honest principal will be susceptible to corrupt 
behavior if they assume everyone else is corrupted. Thus, a society riddled with corruption will stay 
that way as the participants perceive the society to be corrupted. Persson et al. (2013) also point out, 
that even if the majority disapprove corruption and see that they lose by allowing corruption, they will 
choose participate in corruption, as being benevolent will be costly in the short-term, since their actions 
will not change the equilibrium of perceptions (Della Porta and Vannucci, 1999; Rothstein 2011). 
 
For anti-corruption literature, collective action theory gets rid of the assumption that there is a 
benevolent principal that oversees anti-corruption strategy attempts, and thus is suitable to societies 
with a high level of corruption. Persson et al. (2013) do not deny, that monitoring and punishments 
would not work to reduce corruption, but that a non-benevolent principal would not held accountable 
the corrupt agents, which would mean they would be free to be corrupt without concern. Using 
corruption control methods from the principal-agent model could even be detrimental, as they induce 
unnecessary costs without the benefits. Failed corruption control attemptions can also cause cynicism, 
which would lead perception of corruption in society to get even worse (Persson et al., 2013; Mungiu-
Pippidi, 2006; Karklins, 2005) 
 
The way to fix corruption according to the collective action theory, is to completely change the way the 
individuals in situations, where corruption is possible, perceive the other individuals (Persson et al., 
2013). They need to be assured, that there is no corruption in the system, or at least that the corruptible 
ones get caught. What Persson et al. call this radical change of the system is “big push”, a term that 
Aidt (2003) used in his paper as well. Persson et al. summarize that the successful anti-corruption 
reforms in Sweden, Denmark, The United States, Hong Kong, and Singapore used a combination of 
“formal” and “informal” mechanisms to make the push to low corruption society. These included the 
control methods supported by the agency theory, monitoring and punishment mechanism, and 
establishing reciprocity and trust. They also make a note from a previous study on Hong Kong and 
Singapore, that top-down approach, where the high-ranking politicians through their example establish 
trust, can change the assumption of corruptness in a society (Root, 1996). Again, one can connect 
these methods to the arguments made by Aidt, who also saw the “big push” coming from both changing 
the foundation of the institutions (the non-benevolent principal approach) as well as optimizing these 
institutions (the benevolent principal approach). Persson et al. even mention the needed shift from a 




theory of collective action, he saw the same problems as the supporters of that theory and surprisingly 




In this literature review I have used the critical piece of corruption literature by Aidt to raise some 
important factors related to the ongoing battle with corruption. From his paper an easy way to construct 
corruption controls was modeled, which I divided into three groups: wage incentives, monitoring 
systems, and punishments. These three controlling types were already known from the previous 
economic literature, and some empirical research had already been done to test them. No conclusive 
answer for their usefulness could be given though, as these anti-corruption methods seem to not work 
in practice if used without any other methods (Persson et al., 2013). Still, monitoring and incentive 
methods have some empiric relevance showing that they should not be ignored while planning an anti-
corruption strategy. 
 
The assumption of a persistent corruption can be seen from the model in Aidt’s paper, which is relevant 
to the changing view on corruption. While Aidt also emphasizes on the importance of the corruption 
happening between individuals, which is the way agency theory sees corruption, there seems to be a 
bigger picture which would need to be changed for a society to truly lower its corruption level. In Aidt’s 
example a move from a high-corruption equilibrium is not possible without a “big push”, a radical 
change which would deny the effect of past corruptness. This view is also shared by the new wave of 
anti-corruption literature, that aim to view corruption not as individualistically as agency theory, since 
the collective perception of others is for them the most important part to consider. 
 
As this line of thinking is new it is still not enough developed to be used as the “truth” in corruption 
literature. Especially the lack of past research (Marquette & Peiffer, 2018; Persson et al., 2013) is an 
important reason why collective action theory is still too immature to make conclusions of its 
rightfulness. There are some signs that imply its significance in corruption, as can be seen from the 
survey Persson et al. presented in their paper, where Kenyan and Ugandan informants were interviewed. 
Their answers seemed to align with the theories of collective action and thus it should be considered 
when creating an anti-corruption strategy. 
 
What can be concluded is that while agency theory has its flaws, and collective action theory is still a 




corruption, so to completely ignore either of them would be foolish (Marquette & Peiffer, 2018). A good 
way to think of anti-corruption could be something that Aidt recommended in his paper, where 
incentives and monitoring are used in the optimization of institutions, but to really get rid of corruption, 
societies would need to completely change the institutions, as they could be already corrupted, and 
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